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Abstract
To what extent should developing countries eschew conventional command and
control environmental regulation that is increasingly seen as inefficient and rely instead on
economic incentives?  This paper addresses this question as it pertains to industrial air
pollution.  The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of various economic
incentive instruments, presents in-depth case studies of their application in Sweden, the
United States, China, and Poland, and proposes a number of policy guidelines.  We argue that
both design deficiencies and pervasive constraints on monitoring and enforcement impede the
effectiveness of economic instruments in developing countries.  The latter are difficult to
rectify, at least in the medium term.  As a result, tradable permits are generally not practical.
Suitably modified however, emissions fee policies probably are appropriate.  They can
provide a foundation for a transition to an effective economic incentive system, and can raise
much needed revenue for environmental projects and programs.  In addition, if political
opposition can be overcome, environmental taxes constitute a second-best but potentially
effective pollution control instrument.
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THE USE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
WITH INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION
Allen Blackman and Winston Harrington*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Financial, institutional, and political constraints make environmental regulation in
developing countries far more problematic than in industrialized countries.  Yet policy makers
faced with the daunting task of crafting effective regulatory regimes in the developing
countries have at least one advantage over their historical counterparts in the West--they have
several decades of environmental regulatory history to learn from.  What lessons can be
distilled from this history?  In particular, does it imply that developing countries should
eschew conventional command and control policies that, while often effective, are
increasingly seen as inefficient, and should rely instead on economic incentive instruments
such as emissions fees, emissions permits, and taxes on dirty inputs?
This paper reviews international experiences with economic incentive instruments to
distill lessons for developing countries.  Many aspects of these experiences vary across
different types of pollution sources (e.g., industrial versus non-point, air versus water).  Given
space limitations, an all-encompassing discussion would necessarily sacrifice considerable
depth.  Therefore, we focus on industrial air pollution.  The paper is organized as follows.
The next section discusses constraints on environmental regulation in developing countries.
The third section describes the different types of economic incentive regulatory instruments
and briefly reviews the advantages and disadvantages of each.  The fourth section presents a
brief overview of the economic incentive policies in OECD countries followed by four in-
depth case studies.  The last section summarizes and develops policy recommendations.
2. CONSTRAINTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
To varying degrees, all of the types of environmental regulation discussed in this
paper require a public-sector institution capable of establishing rules of conduct for polluters,
monitoring performance with respect to these rules, and enforcing compliance.1  In many
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developing countries, a number of financial and institutional constraints undermine such
capabilities.  The literature has identified four key constraints (e.g., Eskeland and Jimenez,
1992; OECD, 1993; Afsah, LaPlant and Wheeler, 1996; Krupnick, 1997).  First, public
sentiment generally favors economic development over environmental protection.  In
addition, private-sector environmental advocacy--historically a critical stimulus to effective
environmental regulation--is generally less prevalent and less well-organized than in
industrialized countries.  As a result, it is often difficult to muster the political will to enforce
environmental regulations.  Second, environmental regulatory institutions, along with
complementary judicial, legislative and data collection institutions, are generally much
weaker than in industrialized countries.  Third, fiscal and technical resources for
environmental protection are generally in short supply.  Finally, production is often
dominated by hard-to-monitor small-scale firms.
As discussed below, some regulatory instruments are more robust to these four
constraints than others.  In the next section we discuss several different types of regulatory
instruments paying particular attention to this issue.
3.   ECONOMIC INCENTIVE INSTRUMENTS
Environmental regulatory instruments can be classified according to two criteria:
(i) whether they dictate how much to abate and what abatement technology to use or simply
create financial incentives for firms to abate, and (ii) whether they require the regulator to
monitor emissions.  Regulatory instruments that dictate abatement decisions are known as
"command and control" (CAC) regulations.  Examples include emissions standards and
technology standards.  Policies that create financial incentives for abatement by putting an
explicit or implicit price on emissions but which do not dictate abatement decisions are
referred to as "economic incentive" (EI) policies.  The three chief examples of EI policies are
emissions fees, wherein firms pay a fee per unit of emissions; marketable permits, wherein
firms are assigned "allowances" to emit a certain amount of pollution which they may trade
with other firms if they wish; and environmental taxes, which are simply taxes on the inputs
used by polluters or outputs produced by them.2  Policies that require the regulator to monitor
emissions are called "direct" instruments and policies that do not are called "indirect"
instruments.  Emissions standards, emissions fees, and marketable permits are examples of
direct instruments while environmental taxes and technology standards are examples of
indirect instruments.  The two criteria discussed above imply a classification scheme that is
summarized in Table 1 (Eskeland and Jimenez, 1992).
                                               
2 Note that our use of the terms "fee" and "tax" is somewhat arbitrary--these terms are used interchangeably in
the literature.  Nevertheless, here we will use the term "fee" to refer only to charges on emissions, and the term
"tax" to refer only to charges on pollution intensive inputs and outputs.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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Table 1.  A classification of environmental regulatory instruments
Direct Instruments Indirect Instruments
Economic
Incentives
•  emissions fees
•  marketable permits
•  environmental taxes
Command and
Control
•  emissions standards •  technology standards
3.1   An Indirect Economic Incentive Instrument: Environmental taxes
Given the constraints on environmental regulation discussed in Section 2, indirect
instruments like environmental taxes may stand a better chance of being effective since by
definition they are less demanding of regulators than direct instruments.  There are three types
of environmental taxes: taxes on final products associated with pollution (such as motor
vehicles), taxes on goods which are generally used as inputs into a polluting activity (such as
coal), and taxes on polluting substances contained in inputs (such as the sulfur contained in
coal).3  Each of these types of taxes has advantages and disadvantages which we discuss below.
Fiscal and environmental impacts.  Environmental taxes can have two types of
advantageous impacts: fiscal (i.e., they raise revenue) and environmental.  Unfortunately,
these two impacts are inversely related.  Which impact dominates depends on the elasticity of
demand for the taxed good.  For example, consider a tax on gasoline.  If demand for gasoline
is inelastic (i.e., price increases have little effect on demand), then the tax will generate
revenue, but will not significantly reduce gasoline consumption or vehicular emissions.4  But
if demand for gasoline is elastic (i.e., price increases significantly curtail demand), the tax will
generate relatively little revenue but will reduce gasoline consumption and (presumably)
vehicular emissions.  Demand is more elastic the more widely available are substitutes.
Therefore, demand is more elastic when taxes are narrowly targeted.  For example, demand
for high-sulfur coal is likely to be more elastic than demand for coal, and demand for leaded
gasoline more elastic than demand for gasoline.  Hence, narrowly targeted taxes are more
likely to have a significant environmental impact than broadly targeted taxes.  In addition, for
most goods, demand is more elastic in the long run than in the short run, since consumers
                                               
3 While technically not environmental taxation, removal of subsidies on goods linked with pollution has the
same impact.  In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, removing long standing fuel subsidies initiated during
the Soviet period has probably done more to improve environmental quality than any explicit environmental
policy.  See, e.g., Reid and Goldenberg (1998) and Larsen and Shah (1992).  However, subsidies do not always
affect environmental quality adversely.  Eskeland et al. (1994) found that energy subsidies in Indonesia tended to
favor the use of cleaner fuels, and that the removal of these subsidies could have adverse environmental effects.
4 The price elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness of the demand for a good to changes in the
price of the good.  Specifically, it indicates the percent change in demand due to a one percent change in price.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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have more time to substitute in the long run.  Therefore, the dominant impact of an
environmental tax is likely to be fiscal in the short run and environmental in the long run.
The chief motivation for most environmental taxes has generally been revenue
generation.  Much of the debate about tax and fee revenue concerns whether or not it should
be earmarked for environmental expenditures (e.g., OECD, 1993 and 1996).5  The main
argument against earmarking is that it limits the discretion of the government to allocate
revenue to different uses.  The optimal amount of expenditure on pollution control may be
more or less than environmental tax and fee revenue.  For example, in some countries, the
highest valued use for such revenue may be poverty reduction, not pollution control.  In
addition, earmarking may encourage rent seeking in the sectors targeted for subsidies.6
Nevertheless, earmarking is popular because it makes environmental taxes and fees more
politically palatable (by returning revenue to those who are disadvantaged by these
instruments) and because it is seen as a means of correcting for market failures that prevent
firms from obtaining the investment credit.7
Ease of administration.  Environmental taxes are relatively easy to administer for
several reasons.  First, quantities of goods are usually much easier to monitor than quantities
of emissions.  Second, environmental taxes operate through government tax collection
institutions rather than environmental regulatory institutions, and in most developing
countries, the former are more established and effective than the later.  In fact, taxes on fuels
are already quite common in developing countries (Sterner, 1996).  Finally, planners trying to
reduce aggregate emissions by a certain amount need less information to set the requisite tax
than to set the requisite fee.  To set the right fee, planners need to know firms' marginal
abatement costs.  To set the right tax, they only need to know the price elasticity of demand
for the good in question, a parameter that can generally be easily estimated using historical
market data.
Incentives.  Unfortunately, environmental taxes entail a number of disadvantages.
Most important they do not create incentives to abate emissions per se, only to limit purchases
of a good linked with emissions.  This problem is mitigated to the extent there is a direct and
                                               
5 For example, in Central and Eastern Europe environmental taxes revenue has been used to create
"environmental funds" that finance investment in pollution control as well as in public sector regulatory capacity
building.  For a review, see Anderson and Zylicz (1996).
6 The U.S. experience with gasoline taxation provides an instructive example.  By law, all federal (and most
state) gasoline taxes are earmarked for transportation purposes, an allocation that has encouraged the
development of powerful interest groups at both the state and federal level fighting strenuously to prevent the use
of fuel tax revenues for non-transportation (and indeed non-highway) purposes.  See Nivola and Crandall (1994).
7 The advisability of using revenue from environmental taxes to reduce other taxes has also received
considerable attention.  This debate has focused on the extent to which a revenue-neutral swap of environmental
taxes for pre-existing distortionary taxes such as taxes on labor would increase social welfare by both reducing
pollution and curtailing economic distortions (the so-called "double dividend").  Some research has suggested
that, under some circumstances, environmental taxes exacerbate pre-existing tax distortions.  As yet there is no
consensus on this issue.  For a review of the literature, see Parry (1998).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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predictable the link between the taxed good and emissions.  Thus, from the standpoint of
incentives, a tax on the polluting content of a good is preferable to a tax on an input, and a tax
on an input is preferable to a tax on a final product.  For example, of the three different types
of environmental taxes that could be used to reduce emissions from power plants, a tax on the
final product, electricity, can reduce emissions by reducing electricity demand (and hence
electricity production), but can not create incentives to cut emissions per unit of electricity
generated.  A tax on a polluting input, coal, can do this, but can not create incentives to use
clean coal.  A tax on the polluting content of an input, such as a tax on the sulfur content of
coal, can do this but even this type of environmental tax can not create incentives to install
end-of-the-pipe pollution abatement equipment, since plants with such equipment pay the
same unit tax as those without them.8
Targeting.  A related disadvantage of environmental taxes is that they may affect non-
targeted activities.  For example, a tax on coal intended to reduce sulfur emissions from
combustion will affect chemical manufacturers who use coal as a feedstock, not as a fuel.
Here again, a tax on the polluting content of a good is preferable to a tax on an input.  To
continue the above example, a tax on the sulfur content of coal would enable chemical
manufacturers to reduce their tax liabilities by switching to low-sulfur coal.  One solution to
the targeting problem is to exempt certain types of consumers from the tax.  However, this
policy may encourage the creation of black markets for the taxed good.9
Political barriers.  A third disadvantage of environmental taxes is that they may be
less politically acceptable than some other regulatory instruments.  While the costs of CAC
regulations are largely hidden and directly incurred only by polluters (ignoring the indirect
costs consumers pay in higher prices), the costs associated with environmental taxes are
highly visible and also, as noted above, are sometimes directly incurred by non-polluters
(Drayton, 1978).
Distributional impacts.  Finally, environmental taxes may have adverse distributional
impacts, that is, they may have a more severe impact on poor households than on rich ones
(Eskeland and Kong, 1998).  Such impacts are likely to be exacerbated when the taxed good is
a necessity item with few substitutes (such as gasoline).  Here again, the problem is mitigated
to the extent that the tax is narrowly targeted rather than broad-based.  Distributional impacts
may be redressed by using tax revenue to finance new expenditures which benefit poorer
households, or to cut other regressive taxes.
                                               
8 One solution to this incentive problem is to combine an environmental  tax with a second indirect instrument--
a technology standard.  The resulting hybrid policy can be more effective and more efficient than either the tax
or the standard alone (Eskeland and Devarajan, 1996).
9 A related disadvantage is that taxes are difficult to differentiate geographically.  Non-uniform taxes may
encourage black markets.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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3.2 Direct Economic Incentive Instruments:  Emissions fees and marketable permits
3.2.1 Efficiency and flexibility
Economists have long argued that direct EI instruments are superior to CAC
instruments in terms of static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, and flexibility--advantages that
would appear to be especially attractive to developing countries given that financial and
administrative resources are typically in short supply.  Since these properties are well known
(see e.g., Bohm and Russell, 1985), we will only touch on them briefly here.
Static efficiency.  The static efficiency advantages of direct EI instruments stem in part
from the fact that they leave firms free to choose abatement technologies that minimize costs
given their individual circumstances.  By contrast, under CAC technology and emissions
standards, the regulator more or less dictates that whole classes of firms choose certain
technologies.10  Perhaps more important, direct EI instruments create incentives for individual
firms to choose levels of abatement that minimize the aggregate costs of achieving a given
level of environmental quality.  Specifically, firms with low abatement costs are driven to
undertake more abatement than those with higher abatement costs.11  This type of behavior is
probably sufficient by itself to make direct EI policies more cost-effective than most CAC
policies.  For a CAC policy to achieve the same result, the central authority must know the
marginal abatement cost of every polluter which is extremely unlikely in practice.12
Dynamic efficiency.  Although advocates of direct EI instruments generally focus on
static efficiency arguments, the advantages of dynamic efficiency and flexibility may be of
greater long-run importance.  Because firms in direct EI programs can always increase profits
                                               
10 Though CAC emissions standards do not explicitly dictate firms technology decisions, in practice they
usually create strong incentives for firms to choose only officially sanctioned technologies.  Therefore, they can
be regarded as "technology forcing."  In the United States, emissions standards on point sources administered
under both the Clean Air Act (e.g., Lowest Achievable Emissions Rates) and the Clean Water Act (e.g., effluent
guidelines) are developed with reference to the abatement capabilities of specific technologies.  Hence, firms that
want to minimize their risks of being found in violation of such standards will want to adopt the technologies
underlying the standards.  The risk of paying a high penalty for using alternative approaches turns a de jure
emissions standard into a de facto technology standard.
11 In emissions fee programs, firms whose marginal abatement costs are lower than the fee will abate, while
those whose marginal abatement costs are higher than the fee will not abate; they will pay the emissions fee
instead.  In marketable permit programs, firms with abatement costs below the market price of permits will abate
and sell their emissions permits while those with marginal abatement costs above the permit price will not abate;
they will purchase permits instead.  More technically, in both types of EI programs, in theory the marginal
abatement costs of all firms are equated; each source abates to the point where the marginal cost of further
abatement equals the either the fee or the permit price.  The equalization of marginal costs is a necessary
condition, in the standard theoretical model, for least-cost emissions reductions.  The extent to which real-world
EI policies resemble the theoretical ideal is discussed in next section.
12 In the U.S. at least, most CAC policies adopted before 1990 did not even attempt to achieve cost-effective
emission reductions.  The most important economic considerations were distributional: to avoid shutting down
plants, to give breaks to small facilities, and to treat existing facilities more leniently than new ones (Magat et al.,
1986).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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by reducing emissions, such programs provide continuing incentives for emissions-reducing
innovation.  By contrast, in a CAC system, the incentive to innovate is often offset by the
enforcement risks associated with using a non-approved technology and the risk that a well-
performing new technology will serve as the technology-based standard in a new round of
CAC rulemaking--the so-called "regulatory ratchet."
Flexibility.  Finally, EI instruments more easily accommodate change, whether of
environmental standards, economic conditions, or abatement technologies.  In a CAC system,
the regulator must formulate and promulgate thousands of rules concerning different types of
polluters.  By contrast, in an EI system, firms retain control over facility-specific abatement
decisions while the regulator simply sets fees or permit quantities to achieve an environmental
quality standard.  As a result, changes in response to new technologies and economic conditions
are spontaneous and decentralized--the regulator need take no action at all.  Changing the
environmental quality standard is also relatively simple.  In an emissions fee system, all that is
required is to change the fee or fees.  In a marketable permit system, all that is required is to
change the quantity of permits (either by buy them or setting expiration dates on them).13
3.2.2   Monitoring, enforcement and instrument choice
As discussed above, because institutional and economic factors in developing countries
limit regulators' ability to monitor and enforce environmental regulations, indirect instruments
like technology standards may be more effective than direct instruments like emissions
standards.  But what do constraints on monitoring and enforcement imply about the choice
between direct CAC instruments like emissions standards and direct EI instruments like
emissions fees?  Is one type of direct instrument more demanding of monitoring and enforcement
capabilities than the other, and therefore less appropriate for some developing countries?
There is no simple answer to this question.  Monitoring and enforcement requirements
for EI and CAC direct instruments vary across polluting activities and pollutants.  Moreover,
there is very little empirical evidence on the monitoring costs of different types of instruments.
Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that in many contexts, monitoring and enforcement
requirements for direct EI instruments are more demanding than for direct CAC instruments.
To explain further, it is necessary to provide some brief background on monitoring.
Monitoring methods.  The gold standard of source monitoring is the continuous
emissions monitor (CEM), an electronic device permanently attached to the smoke stack that
                                               
13 Despite the often cited advantages of EI instruments, it is striking how infrequently they are encountered.  At
least two factors are relevant.  First, the principal selling point of EI policies--improved economic efficiency--is
something that decision-makers do not seem to care much about since there is rarely a constituency for it.
Instead, there is usually tremendous pressure to assure that the benefits of the regulatory system continue to
accrue to the current "winners" e.g.,  regulators, consulting firms, lawyers and certain segments of industry
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1975).  A second reason for the persistence of CAC policies is inertia--in most countries
CAC policies are the status quo.  This inertia might be easier to overcome if CAC approaches had obviously
failed to improve air quality.  But they have not.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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produces a continuous record of emissions.  Although the cost of CEMs have fallen over the
last decade--and will undoubtedly continue to do so--they are still relatively expensive.  For
example, the average annual per plant cost of the CEMs used in the US Sulfur Dioxide
Program (including capital, operation, and maintenance costs) has been estimated at $124,000
per unit (Schmalensee et al., 1998).  While CEMs may eventually come into widespread use,
today they are relatively rare, even in industrialized countries.14  To date, monitoring of
emissions has principally relied on a number of second-best methods and intermittent auditing.
Second-best monitoring methods include emissions factors, materials-balances, and
indirect monitoring.  Emissions factors are empirically estimated parameters that indicate of
the quantity of a pollutant emitted per unit of output given a variety of equipment and input
characteristics.  For example, an emissions factor for a power plant might indicate the
quantity of sulfur dioxide emitted per kilowatt hour by a plant using a certain type of coal,
boiler, and electrostatic precipitator.  The materials balance approach involves measuring
quantities of a pollutant contained in both inputs and in outputs (including waste streams), and
then using the difference between these measurements to deduce emissions.  For example, to
estimate sulfur dioxide emissions from a coal-burning power plant, one would calculate the
difference between the quantity of sulfur contained in the coal the plant burns and the quantity
of sulfur contained in the fly-ash it collects.  Indirect monitoring involves measuring some
indicator presumed to be correlated with emissions.  Examples include the opacity of flue gas
and the temperatures of boilers.
Each of these second-best methods has serious drawbacks.  Emissions factors can be
grossly inaccurate since for some pollutants such as nitrogen oxides and particulate matter,
emissions depend critically on plant-specific operating conditions that emissions factors do
not take into account.  Not surprisingly, indirect indicators of emissions such as boiler
temperatures can be grossly inaccurate for similar reasons.  The materials balance approach is
the most reliable second-best method.  However it is only applicable to limited number of
industrial activities where there is a relatively simple relationship between pollutant quantities
in input, output, and waste streams.  For example, it can be used to estimate sulfur dioxide and
carbon dioxide emissions but not to estimate nitrogen oxides or particulate emissions.
Regardless of the methodology used, most regulatory authorities do not continuously
monitor compliance.  In many countries they generally settle for a two stage effort--early
monitoring to ensure "initial compliance," and subsequent periodic monitoring to ensure
"continuous compliance."  The rationale for this approach is that once plants have installed the
requisite pollution control equipment--which is easy for inspectors to verify--they are likely to
comply with regulations since the capital cost of the pollution control equipment is sunk.15
                                               
14 Two of the principal exemplars of direct economic incentive programs in industrialized countries--the Sulfur
Dioxide Program in the US and the nitrogen oxides fee system in Sweden--employ CEMs.
15 This rationale is not always valid as operating costs for some pollution control equipment can be
considerable.  See Drayton (1978) and Russell et al. (1986).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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In addition, regulators often adopt a fairly informal "voluntary compliance" process in
which plants are encouraged to report violations and are given a chance to return to compliance
without appreciable penalties.  This process usually works reasonably well (Harrison, 1995;
Russell et al., 1986).  One of the reasons is that polluters tend to install emission control
equipment that over-meets standards, often by a substantial margin (Arora and Cason, 1995).16
The extensive use of voluntary compliance is no doubt testimony to firms' political clout,
especially in local jurisdictions, but it also is to some degree impelled by the difficulty of
monitoring.
Notwithstanding their weaknesses, second best and intermittent monitoring methods
appear to have been fairly effective in ensuring compliance in the United States and Europe.
Most authorities agree that emissions of many air and water pollutants have fallen in absolute
terms in the U.S. and western Europe.17
EI instruments and second-best monitoring.  There are at least four reasons to believe
that second-best and intermittent monitoring methods are likely to be more problematic when
used in the context of direct EI systems than when used in the context of direct CAC
systems.18  First, in a direct EI system, industry is likely to be far less tolerant of second-best
monitoring than in a direct CAC system.  In a fee or permit system, firms' out-of-pocket
regulatory costs (fee and permit payments) are tied directly to emissions, while in an
emissions standard system, such costs do not depend on their emissions as long as firms are
deemed to be in compliance.  Thus, political support for a direct EI system depends on
critically on the perception that monitoring is fair and accurate (Drayton, 1978).
Second, second-best monitoring is likely to seriously degrade the static efficiency
properties that are the principal selling points of emissions fee and marketable permit systems
since these properties depend on plant managers and regulators having accurate information
about emissions.  For example, consider a fee system for nitrogen oxides emissions.  As noted
above, nitrogen oxides emissions (like particulate emissions) depend critically on idiosyncratic
plant-specific operating conditions which can generally be adjusted at relatively low cost
(Sterner and Hoglund, 1998).  In a fee system where fee levels approximate average marginal
                                               
16 It is not clear why the phenomenon is so widespread, but among the possibilities are the existence of
indivisibilities in abatement equipment and sources' need for a margin of error given variations in emissions.  In
addition, it is likely to be related to the combination of permit requirements that encourage bargaining between
regulators and sources to allow some noncompliance in one regulatory arena in return for overcompliance in
another.  See Heyes and Rickman (forthcoming).
17 Several types of evidence support this conclusion:  (i) source-specific emission data, when it exists, shows
that most sources are in compliance much of the time; (ii) data showing improvements, in ambient air quality;
(iii) game-theoretic model which show that it can be in firms' self-interest to comply with regulations even when
expected penalties for noncompliance are low or nonexistent.  See: Harrington (1989); Harford (1993);
Swierzbinski (1994); Heyes and Rickman (forthcoming).
18A specious argument to the contrary is that since EI instruments minimize aggregate abatement costs, industry
will be more likely to comply, and therefore regulators' monitoring and enforcement costs will be lower.  Malik
(1992) shows that aggregate monitoring and enforcement costs can be higher for EI policies even though
aggregate abatement costs are lower.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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abatement costs and where emission are accurately measured, firms with relatively high
emissions of nitrogen oxides due to sub-optimal operating conditions will have incentives
adjust these conditions in order to lower fee payments.  But in a fee system that uses emission
factors, relatively high emissions due to suboptimal operating conditions will not be picked up,
and firms will have no incentives to adjust these conditions.  Similar problems would arise in a
marketable permit system that uses second-best monitoring.
Third, in a marketable permit system, actual trading of permits that gives rise to static
efficiency will not occur unless polluters perceive that monitoring and enforcement is credible
and consistent: firms will only be willing to undertake abatement in order to sell permits if they
believe they will receive full credit for emissions reductions, and they will only be willing to
buy permits if they believe emissions limits implied by allowances will be strictly enforced.  In
short, the viability of the permit market depends on credible monitoring and enforcement.
Second-best monitoring methods are less likely to provide the required level of credibility.
Finally, in a permit system, regulators would not be able to rely on firms over-
controlling emissions to reduce the monitoring burden.  In such a system, firms have a
disincentive to overcontrol, since every unit of emissions abated can be sold to other firms.
Modified EI systems.  It may be possible to mitigate some of the above problems with
second-best monitoring by shifting some of the responsibilities for monitoring onto polluters.
As discussed in Section 3, in some emissions fee systems, monitoring depends  on emissions
factors but firms are given the option of investing in first-best monitoring methods to prove
their actual emissions are lower than the estimated emissions.  In principle, this mechanism
preserves the desirable incentives of direct EI systems, and reduces political opposition
(Swierzbinski, 1994).  However, it is not without drawbacks.  Relatively clean but small or
cash-poor firms may be forced to pay unwarranted fees based on emission factors because
they lack the capital needed to invest in continuous emission monitoring.  Of course, this
creates disincentives for poor firms to be clean.
4.   INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
This section reviews international experiences with EI regulatory instruments.
Subsections 4.1 very briefly overviews the experiences of OECD countries.  The remaining
subsections present detailed case studies of the use of EI instruments in two industrialized
countries--Sweden and the United States--and two developing countries--China and Poland.
4.1   The OECD
During the last two decades, industrialized countries have increasingly grafted EI
policies onto existing CAC regimes.  While European countries have typically opted for
emissions fees and environmental taxes, the United States has favored permit trading.  Today,
although CAC policies still dominate, almost all industrialized countries have adopted someBlackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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EI instruments, and their popularity continues to grow.19  Opschoor (1994) presents the
results of a 1992 survey on the use of EI instruments among Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for the control of air pollution.  The next
three subsections summarize Opschoor's findings.20
4.1.1   Environmental taxes
OECD countries have instituted three types of taxes specifically aimed at abating air
pollution:  carbon taxes, sulfur taxes, and taxes on ozone depleting chemicals.  Six countries levy
carbon taxes:  Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.  In three of the
these countries--Denmark, Norway, and Sweden--the taxes were intended to have an incentive
effect.  All of these programs are still in their infancy and it is too early to tell if they have
succeeded in cutting emissions.  However, as discussed below, Swedish carbon taxes are
relatively high and some impacts are evident.  Three OECD countries--Norway, Sweden, and
Finland--tax the sulfur content of fuels.  The Swedish tax seems to have reduced sulfur
emissions.  Finally, three OECD countries--Denmark, Australia, and the USA--tax ozone
depleting chemicals.  Both the Danish and American taxes seem to have had a significant impact.
4.1.2   Emissions fees
Six OECD countries have emissions fee programs specifically geared toward air
pollution:  Canada (general air pollution), France (acidifying emissions), Japan (sulfur
dioxide), Portugal (sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides), Sweden (nitrogen oxides), and the
United States (criteria air pollutants).  Though the programs in Canada, Japan, Sweden, and
the United States were intended to have an impact on emissions, only the Swedish program
has clearly had such an effect.  It is discussed in detail below.
4.1.3   Tradable permits
Three OECD countries have tradable permit programs aimed at air quality control:  the
USA, Canada, and Germany (the only other tradable permit programs of any type are in
Sweden and Australia).  The American programs are the oldest and have received the most
attention.  The three principal American permit trading programs are the Emissions Trading
Program, the Sulfur Dioxide Program, and the Ozone Program.  The first two US programs
are discussed in more detail below.
                                               
19 In eight countries studied by Opschoor (1994) the number of economic incentive policies grew by 50%
between 1987 and 1994.
20 For a more detailed analysis of the OECD experience, see Vos et al. (1994).  For other case studies see
Anderson and Lohof (1997) and Huber et al. (1996).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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4.2   Sweden
As noted above, Sweden's tax and fee programs stand out among EI programs in
OECD countries as having clearly changed firm behavior.  Sweden has three EI air pollution
control policies:  a carbon tax, a sulfur tax, and a nitrogen oxides emissions fee.  The two
taxes are levied on the carbon and sulfur contents of various fossil fuels and therefore, in our
lexicon, are "taxes" not "fees."
4.2.1   Sweden's carbon tax21
Initiated in January 1991, Sweden's carbon tax grew out of a drastic reform of the
national tax system that essentially consisted of cutting income taxes and energy taxes and
raising or initiating value added taxes, sales taxes, and carbon taxes to offset the lost revenue.
Although energy taxes were halved, the imposition of new carbon taxes more than
compensated for this reduction.  As a result, coal prices rose by 80 percent, oil prices by
20 percent, and natural gas prices by 100 percent.  However, the 1991 tax regime was short-
lived.  Extensive lobbying by industry led to a second round of tax reforms in 1993 which
differentiated taxes across sectors.22  The net effect of these reforms was to reduce energy
prices relative to the 1991 level for industry, and to raise energy prices relative to the 1991
level for other sectors.  A third round of tax reforms in 1997 doubled carbon taxes paid by
industry.  Revenue from carbon taxes is not earmarked.  The administration of carbon taxes
has been handled by existing tax authorities.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the carbon tax on emissions since the imposition
of the tax coincided with other fiscal reforms and since the tax has changed so frequently.
Nevertheless, Bohlin (1998) finds that carbon taxes have significantly reduced emissions in
some non-industrial sectors such as district residential heating.  Revenue from carbon taxes
has been substantial.  In 1995, it generated US $1.6 billion, approximately one percent of
Sweden's GDP.  Administrative costs attributed to carbon taxes are estimated at roughly five
percent of total revenue.
4.2.2   Sweden's sulfur tax
Sweden's sulfur tax, also initiated in January 1991 as part of the national tax reform, is
a tax on the sulfur content of coal, peat, and oil.  The tax rate, US $3,900 per ton, was based
on a calculation of the average marginal cost of abating sulfur emissions and is considerably
higher than rates used in other countries (Lovgren, 1994).  Fuels that are used for purposes
other than energy (e.g., petrochemicals) and fuels containing less than one percent sulfur by
weight are exempted from the tax.  To reward firms that have installed end-of-pipe treatment
                                               
21 This section is based on Bohlin (1998).
22 The new law set carbon taxes for industry at US $27 per ton for coal, $31 per cubic meter for oil, and $23 per
cubic meter for natural gas, and set carbon taxes for other sectors at $107, $123, and $91 respectively.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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systems, the tax is refunded when emissions are controlled by scrubbers.23  To prevent
cheating, firms that claim refunds are subjected to continuous emissions monitoring.  The
sulfur tax supplements a pre-existing CAC regime involving permitting and emissions
standards.  Revenue from the sulfur tax is not earmarked.  Administration of the tax is
handled by the same authorities that handle energy and carbon taxes.
The impact of the sulfur tax is difficult to evaluate because of parallel CAC
regulations, simultaneous tax reforms, and structural changes in the Swedish economy.
Nevertheless, there are strong indications that the tax has significantly reduced sulfur
emissions.  Aggregate sulfur emissions decreased by 25 percent in the first year the tax was
administered.  More tellingly, after the imposition of the tax in 1991 but prior to the
tightening of CAC emissions standards in 1993, the average sulfur content of heavy fuel oil
fell  from 0.65 percent to 0.40 percent (Lovgren, 1994).  According to OECD (1997), annual
sulfur emissions have fallen by about 6,000 tons per year as a direct result of the tax.  The
sulfur tax generated around US $39 million in 1992 (Lovgren, 1994).  Revenue has been less
than expected because the tax has reduced the demand for high-sulfur fuels (OECD, 1997).
Administrative costs are estimated to have been less than one percent of total revenues
(OECD, 1997).
4.2.3   Sweden's nitrogen oxides fee
In 1992, Sweden imposed a fee on emissions of nitrogen oxides from electricity and
heat generating plants.  The fee, US $5,200 per ton, together with a tightening of CAC
regulations, was designed to reduce emissions by 30 percent over three years.  Continuous
monitoring is used to measure emissions for most plants.24  CEMs were deemed necessary
because, as noted above, emissions of nitrogen oxides depend on the plant-specific operating
conditions and as a result, second-best monitoring methods can be grossly inaccurate.  The
annual cost of operating and maintaining CEMs has been estimated at US $39,000 per plant
or US $520 per ton of nitrogen oxides abated (Lovgren, 1994).  Given the magnitude of these
costs, small sources have been exempted from the fee.25  To avoid giving small plants a
competitive advantage, the revenue from the fee is refunded to the payees.  To avoid
dampening the incentive effect of the fee, revenue is refunded in proportion to the amount of
energy produced.  As a result, plants with high emissions per unit output are net providers of
funds--that is, their fee payments exceed their refunds--while plants with low emissions per
unit output are net recipients of funds.  Unfortunately, entire sectors which for technological
                                               
23 Over half of firms that pay sulfur taxes receive such refunds (OECD, 1997)
24 Plants have the option of using emission factors instead of CEMs, but emissions factors are set at levels
intended to discourage this option.
25 Originally the program exempted plants with less than 10 MW installed capacity or 50GW annual output, so
that it covered approximately 200 plants that accounted for 40 percent of the nitrogen oxides emissions from the
energy sector.  In 1997, the criteria for participation was changed to exempt only plants producing less than
40GWh per year.  This change brought 600 more plants into the program (OECD, 1997; Sterner and Hoglund,
1998)Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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reasons tend to have higher emissions per unit output (e.g., metal production) have tended to
become net providers of funds while other sectors with lower emissions per unit output (e.g.,
waste incineration) have become net recipients (OECD, 1997).
The nitrogen oxides fee has clearly had a strong impact on emissions.  Total emissions
from monitored plants fell by 40 percent in the first two years of the program.26  For most
plants, there were no changes in CAC regulations during this time, so most of the reduction
can be attributed to the emission fee (Lovgren, 1994, Sterner and Hoglund, 1998).27  The fee
program generates approximately $80 million per year which is refunded to payees.  The
annual cost of administering the program has been estimated at approximately 0.2 to 0.3
percent of the annual revenues (Sterner and Hoglund, 1998).
4.3   The United States
This section discusses two of the most important permit trading programs in the
United States, the Emission Trading Program and the Sulfur Dioxide Program.
4.3.1   The Emissions Trading Program28
Background.  The Emissions Trading Program (ETP), the oldest US air permit
program, was grafted onto a complex CAC regime for industrial air pollution control.29  The
ETP grew out of frustration with existing CAC regulation that, if interpreted strictly, would
have prohibited the building of new sources in areas not in attainment with ambient air quality
standards.  To accommodate economic growth under the CAC regime, the EPA established a
program of "offsets" whereby new sources are allowed to locate in non-attainment zones if
they are able to secure sufficient "emissions reductions credits" from existing firms.
Emissions reductions credits evolved into the hard currency of a tradable permit market.  By
1986, the EPA had formalized rules to allow three other kinds of transactions: "netting",
"bubbles", and "banking."  Netting allows old sources wanting build new facilities to avoid
strict new source regulations by, among other things, applying emissions reductions credits
earned in old facilities to new facilities.  Banking, instituted in 1979, allows firms to store
emissions reductions credits for subsequent use.  Bubbles, also instituted in 1979, allow two
or more sources to be treated as one emissions source.  The bubble provisions were supposed
to encourage both internal and external trading of emissions reductions credits and, according
                                               
26 Emissions reductions have been achieved by improving combustion efficiency, installing selective
noncatalytic reduction systems, and flue gas cleaning (scrubbing).
27 There is some evidence that, despite the supposed neutrality of the refund mechanism, plants that are net
providers of fee refunds have undertaken more abatement than those that are net recipients (OECD, 1997).
28 This section is based on Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991); Foster and Hahn (1995); Hahn and Hester (1989);
Kete (1994); and Tietenberg (1990a and 1990b).
29 The CAC regime has three main components:  national ambient air quality standards for six different
pollutants, state implementation plans that specify emissions standards and other controls necessary to meet the
ambient air quality standards, and best available technology standards for a variety of sources.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
15
to Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), were supposed to be the centerpiece of the ETP since they
most closely resembled theoretical models of emissions trading.
Impacts.  In general, the impacts of the ETP have been significant but much more
limited than its proponents had hoped.  The number of trades has been far smaller than
expected.  By 1986 there had been about 150 bubble transactions, 2,000 offset transactions,
5,000-12,000 netting transactions, and only about 100 banking transactions (Hahn and Hester,
1989).  Moreover, most of the bubble trades were internal, that is, between firms owned by
the same parent corporation.  Most analysts agree that the environmental impacts of the ETP
have been negligible, a result that is not surprising given that cost effective compliance with
existing standards was the primary motivation for the program.  Although the program has
resulted in significant cost savings--on the order of $10 billion as of 1986 according to Hahn
and Hester (1989)--the savings have been lower than expected.  Moreover, the bulk of the
savings have come from netting transactions which more closely resemble regulatory relief
than regulatory reform (Tietenberg, 1990a).
Lessons.  Why has the ETP not performed as well as advertised?  Most analysts agree
that five factors are to blame.  First, expectations were unrealistically high.  Second, existing
CAC regulations have restricted trading.  For example, current rules require that no individual
trade can result in increased emissions from a participating firm.  This restriction rules out
multilateral trades that increase emissions of some firms but reduce overall emissions.  As a
result, cost savings are lower.  Also, ETP rules severely restrict new firms' ability to trade
even though they have the greatest incentives to do so since they are subject to the strictest
standards.  Third, transactions costs for firms involved in permit trading are high, due in no
small part to the regulatory administrative requirements.  Foster and Hahn (1995) found that
in the Los Angeles basin, which has the greatest level of trading in the ETP, transactions costs
frequently exceed the market value of the emissions reductions credits.  Fourth, firms have
limited information about the market for permits.  And finally, firms are often reluctant to
participate in the permit market because of uncertainty about future regulation.
4.3.2   The Sulfur Dioxide Program
Background.  While the Emissions Trading Program is the oldest US air permit
trading program, the Sulfur Dioxide Program has arguably been the most successful.  A
centerpiece of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Sulfur Dioxide Program was
designed to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from electric power plants to half of their 1980
levels.  It is being implemented in phases.  In Phase I which began in January 1995 and runs
through December 1999, an interim cap on aggregate emissions of 5.7 million tons per year
was established for 110 of the most polluting power plants.30  In Phase II which will begin in
                                               
30 These 110 plants are mostly comprised of coal-fired plants east of the Mississippi river.  In addition, units
which are not covered by the program have the option of volunteering to participate.  263 units at 110 plants
were originally covered in Phase I but 182 more units "volunteered' to participate (Schmalensee et al., 1998).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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January 2000, a cap of 8.95 million tons per year will be established for all generating units in
the continental United States larger than 25 MW as well as all new units of any size.  To
enforce the aggregate emissions caps in each phase, utilities are allocated a certain number of
allowances, each of which entitles them to emit one ton of sulfur.  Allocations are based on
historical levels of fuel consumption.  Utilities are audited at the end of each year to ensure
that their emissions have not exceeded their allowances.  Exceedances are severely
sanctioned.31  To reduce the cost of meeting the emission caps, utilities are permitted to trade
allowances with any party anywhere in the continental United States or to "bank" them, i.e.,
carry them forward into the next year.  Unlike the Emissions Trading Program, there are no
restrictions on trading on the basis of environmental or economic benefits.32  To ensure that
new plants are able to obtain allowances (and to improve information about the market for
allowances), the EPA auctions off between two and three percent of the total allocation of
allowances each year.
Impacts.  The Sulfur Dioxide Program has had strong environmental and economic
impacts.  Regarding the former, the program has achieved its ambitious emissions reductions
targets.  As of 1997, sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants were more than four million
tons below their 1980 levels (Tietenberg, 1999).33  Regarding economic impacts, the Sulfur
Dioxide Program has entailed considerable costs for firms--emissions reductions have cost
about $200 per ton (Schmalensee et al., 1998)--but has also delivered considerable cost
savings.  According to Stavins (1998a) compliance cost savings from the program are on the
order of $1 billion annually compared to CAC regulatory alternatives.34  There has been some
debate about the extent to which cost savings are due to actual trading of allowances as
opposed to the substitution of emissions standards for technology standards.  According to
Schmalensee et al. (1998), actual trading has reduced costs by 25 to 34 percent compared to
an allowance regime with no trading.
Lessons.  Recent evaluations of the Sulfur Dioxide Program points to a number of
factors that have contributed to its effectiveness (Stavins, 1998b, Tietenberg, 1999).  First,
there was a conscious effort to minimize transactions costs by, among other things, allowing
trades without prior approval.  Second, the use of CEMs has helped build market confidence.
Third, the program has not limited the means by which firms can meet emissions standards.
                                               
31 Sanctions include a forfeit of $2000 and one allowances per ton of exceedance.
32 However, power plants are required to meet all local and national pollution control standards regardless of the
number of allowances they hold.
33 In fact, in 1995 and 1996, emissions were significantly below allowed levels.  The reasons included
expectations that allowance prices would rise in the future, and unanticipated declines in the prices of low-sulfur
coal.  Switching to low- and lower-sulfur fuels--a compliance strategy that would have been strongly
discouraged under a technology standard system--has accounted for over half of the total reductions in sulfur
emissions (Schmalensee et al., 1998).
34 Though large in absolute magnitude, these savings only constitute about 0.5 percent of the total annual costs
of electricity generation (OECD, 1997).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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Fourth, in contrast to the Emissions Trading Program which has been overlaid on existing
regulation, the Sulfur Dioxide Program was designed to substitute for existing regulation.
Relatedly, the baseline for the program was clearly defined as an aggregate level of emissions,
whereas in Emissions Trading Program, it was defined as emissions reduction above and
beyond complex existing legal requirements.  Finally, the program was oriented toward
emissions reductions as well as cost savings and was therefore successful in garnering political
support.  But, despite some clear successes, several aspects of Sulfur Dioxide Program raise
concerns about the appropriateness of permit trading programs for developing countries.
Administrative and monitoring costs.  Incremental administrative costs associated with
the Sulfur Dioxide Program (i.e., administrative costs incurred by both regulators and firms
above and beyond costs incurred in conventional CAC system) are significant.  They include
the costs of:  keeping track of all trades via the Allowance Tracking System; holding yearly
auctions; buying permits; trading permits; and monitoring firms' emissions to ensure that they
do not exceed permitted levels.  Though ex-post information on all administrative costs
(except monitoring costs) has yet to be tabulated, rough ex ante estimates for 1993-2000 are
available.  Total incremental administrative costs (leaving aside monitoring costs, at least
some of which would be paid under a CAC system) were estimated at between $270 and $481
million of which $50.6 to $57.1 million would be paid by the regulator and the balance by
firms.  The bulk the costs incurred by firms consist of transactions costs (ICF, 1992).35
Importantly, monitoring costs associated with the Sulfur Dioxide Program are also
significant.  All plants that participate in the program are required to install CEMs, flow
monitors and opacity monitors.  Among the reasons for this provision were fears that if an
emissions factor approach was used, utilities would receive credit for installing scrubbers but
might not operate them, and also a recognition that the viability of the allowance market
would depend on the credibility of enforcement.  The average annual cost of continuous
emissions monitoring (including operating and annualized capital costs) is approximately
$124,000 per generating unit (Schmalensee et al., 1998, 55).36
Volume of trading.  In the first years of the program, the volume of allowances traded
was lower than expected.  Between the time the program was inaugurated in January 1990
and March 1993, only 130,00 allowances were traded, and the majority of these were between
units owned by the same firm.  However, by March 1997, the volume of trades had increased
20 fold (Schmalensee et al., 1998).  Low trading volumes in the first years of the program
were blamed on a variety of institutional rigidities including:  rules passed by local utility
                                               
35 The cost of  the Allowance Tracking System, including transactions costs incurred by firms, was estimated at
roughly $304 million, the cost of holding auctions at $4.5 million, the cost of buying permits at $68 million.
Although there are considerable transactions costs associated with the Sulfur Dioxide Program, Tietenberg
(1999) argues that they have been minimal compared to precursor programs like the Emissions Trading Program.
Economic analysis of the program supports this view (Montero, 1997).
36 EPA estimated that the fixed capital costs of continuous monitoring for each firm would be approximately
$302,200 while the operation and maintenance costs would be $78,700 per year (ICF, 1992).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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regulators that discouraged trading and encouraged the continued use of local coal together
with scrubbers; uncertainty about whether allowances would be limited by other pollution
control legislation or affected by coming utility market deregulation; defects in the auction
mechanism; and transactions costs associated with trading (Klaassen, 1996).  However some
analysts have argued that low trading volumes resulted not so much from institutional
rigidities as from low demand for allowances due to unanticipated cost-saving innovations in
the markets for scrubbers and low-sulfur coal transportation (Burtraw, 1996).
4.4   China
Although China's market reforms have sparked two decades of extraordinary
economic growth, the environmental cost has been significant.  Particulate and sulfur dioxide
levels in many Chinese cities are two to five times higher than World Health Organization
standards (World Bank, 1997).  The principal contributors to this problem are a multitude of
aging state-owned dirty industries and a heavy dependence on coal for primary energy.37  In
this section, we describe China's efforts to use emissions fees to control air pollution.
Key features.  China's first comprehensive Environmental Protection Law, passed
rather belatedly in 1979, established a mixed regulatory system based on both emissions fees
and emissions standards.38  The original intent of the fee system was to enforce compliance
with emissions standards.  Therefore, polluters are only required to pay a fee only on those
emissions that exceed emissions standards.  To encourage eventual compliance with
emissions standard, firms that violate standards for three consecutive years are assessed a fee
increase of five percent per year.  To create incentives for newly built plants to install
pollution control equipment, all fees for plants built after 1979 (the year the fee system was
initiated) are doubled, and fee increases for non-compliant plants increase by 100 percent per
year (instead of 5 percent per year).  Fees are set by the central government but provincial and
local governments may raise them.  As a result, there is substantial variation in fees.  Fees
tend to be higher in more developed provinces and, within provinces, for old and state-owned
sources (Wang and Wheeler, 1996; Dasgupta, Huq, and Wheeler, 1997).  Fees are charged on
20 different air pollutants.  However, when more than one pollutant is above the permissible
level, enterprises are only required to pay fees for the "worst case pollutant," i.e., the one
pollutant that involves the largest fee payment.  The national floor on fee rates is roughly US
$280 to $700 per ton for particulate matter (depending on the source) and roughly US $280
per ton for most other common airborne pollutants including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides
and carbon monoxide (Yang et al., 1997).
                                               
37 Industrial sources account for roughly three-quarters of sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions (Wang and
Wheeler, 1996)
38 The fee system has evolved through three stages:  trial implementation in selected cities (1979-81);
nationwide implementation (1982-87); and reform and refinement (1999-present) (Yang et al., 1997).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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Monitoring and enforcement.  The monitoring needed to assess fees is based on self-
reporting, periodic auditing, and a crude monitoring technology.  Each enterprise is required
to monitor emissions concentrations daily and to report monitoring data to the local
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB).  To check the accuracy of firms' reports EPBs
compare them with past reports and with reports for similar firms and also make unannounced
spot checks.  Actual monitoring of emissions by both firms and EPBs is based on visual
inspection of the opacity of flue gases.  Inspectors rank opacity on a scale of one to five using
the a set of gray-scale cards commonly known as the Ringelmann scale.39  This opacity
measure is combined with estimates of emissions volumes to assess fees.  Thus, even though
fees are ostensibly differentiated across 20 pollutants, actual fees are based on a single crude
measure of concentration (Yang et al., 1997).  Fines may be imposed for false reporting, and
for interfering with inspections.  However, both the probability of getting caught for under-
reporting and the penalty for doing so are quite low.  In most cases, firms caught under-
reporting are simply required to provide an explanation (Yun, 1997).
Revenue.  Approximately $3 billion in fee revenue was collected between 1979 and
1995.  Twenty-nine percent of this amount--an average of roughly $54 million per year--was
paid by air polluters (Yang et al, 1997).  Fee revenue is earmarked for investments in
pollution control.  Law dictates that 80 percent of fee revenue be used to subsidize pollution
control investments by the enterprises that pay the fees and the remaining 20 percent (along
with all fines) be used to fund the operations of EPBs.40  Of the funds provided to enterprises,
92 percent are used for plant-specific projects and the remainder for collective treatment
facilities (Wang, Zhang, and Wu, 1997).  Revenue from emissions fees accounts for only
about 6 percent of total capital investment in pollution control.41    
Impact.  There is some disagreement in the literature about the impact of the fee
system on emissions.  On one hand, proponents of the fee system point to evidence that
emissions per unit of output fell precipitously after the establishment of the fee system.  In
addition, some econometric studies using province-level data show that there is a statistically
significant negative correlation between "effective fee levels" (the actual amount of fees paid
                                               
39 The Ringelmann scale was developed in France in late 1800's as a means of measuring the efficiency of coal-
fired boilers.  Darker smoke meant poorer efficiency.  The Ringelmann scale came into widespread use in
Western countries as a measure of air pollution in the early part of the century and was used in some contexts by
the EPA until 1974 (Eastern Technical Associates, 1999).
40 However, historically, EPBs have absorbed just over 30 percent of the fee revenues (Wang, Zhang, and Wu,
1997).
41 The bulk of  investment in pollution control comes from:  new construction (36 percent from 1991-93);
reconstruction of existing plants (9 percent); and from an urban services fee paid by enterprises (39 percent)
(Wang, Zhang, and Wu, 1997).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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per unit of emissions) and emissions.42  But neither argument is altogether convincing.
Regarding the former, the fee system was established at the same time as emissions standards
and it is difficult to disentangle the impacts of the two instruments.  Regarding the
econometric studies, as discussed in the next section, there are reasons to believe that
"effective fees" may be a poor indication of regulatory stringency.
Most analysts have argued that is it unlikely that emissions fees by themselves have
been responsible for improved environmental performance.  They point out that fees are well
below marginal abatement costs for most firms, and therefore provide limited abatement
incentives (Florig et al., 1995; Yun, 1997; Yang et al., 1997).43   More damning, an extensive
firm-level study of the incentive effects of emissions fees (including an econometric study)
found that incentives created by fees were limited (Yun, 1997).  The study found that
emissions fees are so low compared to marginal abatement costs that in many cases, even
polluters with abatement equipment already installed prefer to pay fees rather than pay to
operate their abatement equipment.
Problems.  As noted above, one of the main problems with China's fee system is that
the fees are set too low, in part because they have been eroded by inflation.  Though fees have
been in use for 20 years, they have only been increased one time (in 1991).
A second problem is that, the level of fees aside, the structure of the fees curtails
incentives to abate.  Because firms only pay fees on emissions that exceed the legal standard, they
have no incentives to reduce emissions below the standard.  In addition, because firms only pay
fees on the "worst case pollutant" they have no incentives to abate emissions of other pollutants.
As discussed at length by Yun (1997) and Wang et al. (1997), a third critical problem
is that fees actually create strong perverse incentives for enterprises and EPBs to perpetuate
non-compliance.  For enterprises, the problem arises for two reasons.  First, enterprises are
allowed to count most fee payments as production costs.44  Thus, fees lower enterprises' tax
liabilities, a very important consideration given that tax rates on profits are on the order of
33 percent.  Second, enterprises are usually able to recoup the lion's share of the fees they pay.
As noted above, 80 percent of fees are returned to enterprises, ostensibly for investment in
pollution control.  But local EPBs simply do not have the resources or political will to closely
monitor how enterprises use funds.  Therefore, in many cases, fee revenue ends up being used
for non-environmental purposes.  According to Yun (1997), many enterprises view the fee
system as 'depositing money in a bank' and often actually overpay fees in order to lower their
                                               
42 Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler (1997) found that each one percent increase in effective air emissions fees
leads to a decrease of approximately 0.3 percent in sulfur dioxide intensity, and a 0.4 to 0.8 percent decrease in
particulate matter.
43 However, Dasgupta, Huq and Wheeler (1996) found the opposite.  They argue that early in the regulatory
process, industrial emissions intensity is highly responsive to changes in the price of pollution because marginal
costs are often quite low.   
44 Enterprise are allowed to count as production costs all fees except those on emissions that are above standard
for the third consecutive year, fees paid by factories built after 1979, and fines for underreporting and for late
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tax liabilities.45  Thus, the fee system actually creates incentives for enterprises to be out of
compliance so that they can pay fees.  Aware of the problem, in 1988 the state mandated that
funds be returned to enterprises in the form of loans rather than grants.  However, this rule has
not been enforced.  EPBs are able to subvert it by exempting enterprises from repaying loans
or by simply not enforcing repayment.
The fee system creates parallel perverse incentives for EPBs to perpetuate non-
compliance.  EPBs depend heavily on fee revenues for financial support.  For example, Yun
(1997) found that EPBs derived 70 to 93 percent of their operating revenues from fee revenues.
Hence EPBs, like firms, have strong incentives to maintain a steady flow of fee payments.
A related problem is that, leaving aside incentives for non-compliance, enforcement is
often weak.  Unprofitable enterprises are usually able to escape paying fees by appealing to
local authorities.  Enforcement is especially weak for small-scale enterprises, most notably
China's eight million township and village industrial enterprises that account for about one half
of total industrial output and that are the major source of pollution in rural areas.  Many of
these enterprises fall outside of the formal regulatory system altogether (World Bank, 1997).46
4.5   Poland
In Poland, as in most transitional countries, decades of central planning have left a
legacy of serious environmental problems.  Polish emissions per unit of GDP of sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter are two to eight times average OECD levels.
Air pollution is primarily caused by emissions from large stationary sources.  Power plants are
probably the worst polluters.  Structural (as opposed to regulatory) factors that contribute to
high levels of emissions include:  the dominance of relatively dirty heavy industries such as
metallurgy, chemical production, and mining; extremely high levels of energy intensity; and
dependence on relatively low-quality indigenous coal and lignite (Adamson et al., 1996).  In
this section, we describe Poland's efforts to use emissions fees to control air pollution.
Key features.  Poland's airborne emissions fee system was established in 1980.  A
decade later, in concert with other Eastern Block countries, Poland enacted new legislation
which revamped the emissions fee system and also tightened complementary CAC
regulations.47  Like most of its neighbors, Poland has a hybrid fee/standard instrument:  a
                                               
45 Because enterprises use fees to lower their tax liabilities, local tax collection bureaus have actually
discouraged the raising of fees.  In some extreme cases the they have even set a limit on the total amount of fees
that can be assessed. (Yun, 1997).
46 NEPA, China's National Environmental Protection Agency, plans a number of reforms to deal with some of the
problems discussed above (NEPA, 1997).  These include:  extending fees to cover all emission instead of just those
that exceed the standard; charging fees on all pollutants instead of one 'worst case' pollutant; raising fees above
marginal abatement costs and indexing them to inflation; and putting stronger conditions on the use of fee revenues
by firms.  China has begun experimenting with "local environmental funds" to improve the allocation of fee
revenues.  These are semi-private investment companies that are administratively separate from EPBs and which
therefore have the potential to be more objective about how funds are disbursed (Wang, Zhang, and Wu, 1997).
47 For a review of pollution fee systems in Central and Eastern Europe, see Vincent and Farrow (1997).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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"normal fee" is paid on all emissions below an emissions standard and a "penalty fee" up to ten
times higher than the normal fee is paid on all emissions above the standard.  In Poland,
emissions standards are source-specific and are set by a permitting process.  Permit applicants
are required to submit an extensive environmental impact analysis and to have their applications
reviewed by an independent government-approved expert (Anderson and Fiedor, 1997).
Fee rates are determined by Poland's national environmental ministry for 62 specific
air pollutants and seven different types of evaporative air emissions.  The relative levels of the
fees are based on their presumed potential to cause environmental damage.  The absolute
levels of the fees are supposed to be determined by a number of considerations including
ambient air quality guidelines and marginal abatement costs, but in practice are determined by
political acceptability and revenue requirements (Anderson and Fiedor, 1997).
Fee rates are revised annually.  Until the 1990, fees were quite low.  However, since
that time they have increased dramatically, some by a factor of 20.  In 1995, the highest
"normal" fee for air emissions was US $54,000 per ton for various hazardous air pollutants.
That same year, the "normal" fees were $83 per ton for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides and
$44 per ton for particulate matter (Anderson and Fiedor, 1997).
Monitoring of emissions relies on self-reporting and emissions factors.  Local
regulators are supposed to verify self-reports.  Firms are allowed to defer penalty fee
payments for three to five years.  Deferred payments can be waived if the firm is in
compliance by the end of the deferral period.
Revenue.  In 1994, regulators levied $246 in airborne emissions fees (both "normal"
and "penalty" fees) of which 90 percent ($221 million) was actually collected.  Fee revenue is
distributed to a national environmental fund (36 percent), 49 regional environmental funds (54
percent), and 2,400 local environmental funds (10 percent).48  The environmental funds
disburse the revenue to polluters (in the form of subsidized credit and grants) and to
regulators.  Revenue is also used for public-sector pollution control infrastructure such as
water treatment and coal washing facilities.  Environmental funds account for nearly half of
annual capital costs of all investment in Poland (Anderson and Fiedor, 1997).
Impacts.  Until the fee system was revamped in 1990, it had no discernable effect on
either pollution levels or revenue.  Since then fees have clearly had an impact on revenue.
Their impact on emissions is less clear, in part because the imposition of fees has coincided
with the tightening of CAC standards and with drastic economic restructuring.  There is little
doubt that "normal" fees have been set too low to have had much impact on abatement.
However, according to Anderson and Fiedor (1997), "penalty" fees do provide significant
incentives to abate.  Bates et al. (1994), appear to concur, arguing that in the early 1990s,
emission fees stimulated emissions reductions, at least for particulates and sulfur dioxide.
                                               
48 For nitrogen oxides, 90 percent of revenue goes to the national fund since nitrogen oxides pollution is
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Problems.  Aside from the level of the fees, there are a number of important barriers to
the effectiveness of Poland's fee system, all of which echo problems with China's system.
First, monitoring and enforcement is quite weak.  Regulators have a limited ability to verify
self-reported emissions for the usual reasons:  they are undermanned, underfinanced, and lack
public support.  In addition, their ability to levy and collect fees is limited by political
concerns: many of the worst polluters are large politically powerful enterprises.  Although
enterprises have been closed down periodically for environmental reasons, most quickly
resume operations.  Limitations on monitoring and enforcement are apparent from the fact
that in 1992, fully 40 percent of all registered air polluters (and 55 percent of water polluters)
were operating without valid permits needed to calculate fees and were therefore effectively
exempted from the fee system.  Also illustrative is the fact that in 1992, only 20 percent of
"penalty" fees levied were actually collected (Anderson and Zylicz, 1996).  Second,
notwithstanding extensive privatization, many large enterprises are state-owned and still
operate under soft budget constraints.  Since such firms can effectively count emissions fees
as operating expenses, fees do not create strong incentives to abate.  Many state-owned firms
receive waivers and subsidies or simply violate regulations with impunity (Bates et al., 1994).
Even private firms are allowed to count "normal" fee payments as production costs in order to
lower their tax liabilities, a concession that erodes the incentive effect of fees (Anderson and
Fiedor, 1997).  Third, the use of fee revenue to subsidize regulatory activity and pollution
control investment creates perverse incentives to maintain the flow of fee revenue (Bates
et al., 1994).  Finally, coal is widely used for residential heating.  As a result, thousands of
small fixed-point sources fall outside of the fee system (Adamson et al., 1996).49
5.   CONCLUSION
The four case studies presented above provide a number of important lessons about the
use of EI instruments in developing countries.  In what follows, we consider the implications
of these case studies for each of the three types of EI instruments discussed in this paper:
emissions fees, tradable permits, and environmental taxes.
5.1   Emissions Fees
The effectiveness of emissions fees can be judged by their impact on the environment,
revenue generation, and on regulatory administrative costs.  In terms of the first criteria,
Sweden's nitrogen oxides fee has been the most successful, having clearly reduced emissions.
Opinions vary widely on whether and to what extent Chinese and Polish emissions fees have
had a significant environmental impact.  Emissions fees in all three countries have generated
                                               
49 Given the existence of these barriers, it is not feasible in the foreseeable future to rely exclusively on emission
fees to achieve air quality objectives.  Bates et al. (1994) recommend pursuing a 'mixed' regulatory system,
including a ban on the use of dirty fuels by small sources in urban areas and a combination of increased
emissions fees, tradable permits, and CAC regulation for large polluters.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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significant revenue: roughly $80 million per year in Sweden from nitrogen oxides fees; $54
million per year in China from fees on a variety of air pollutants; and $221 million per year in
Poland from fees on a variety of air pollutants.  Information on administrative costs is
incomplete.  We know only that in the case of Swedish nitrogen oxides fees, administrative
costs have been estimated at 0.2 to 0.3 percent of revenues, a figure that analysts consider
quite low.  Thus, while emissions fees appear to be an effective revenue generating
mechanism in all three countries, they have only clearly had a significant environmental
impact in Sweden.
Why have emissions fees in China and Poland not had a bigger environmental impact?
Part of the answer has to do with the design of the fee system, in particular, the level and
structure of fees and the means by which earmarked fee revenue is refunded.  Regarding the
level of fees, some fees in both countries are set well below marginal abatement costs so that
firms generally prefer paying fees to investing in abatement.  For example, nitrogen oxides
fees in China and Poland are $280 per ton and $83 per ton respectively.  By contrast,
Sweden's nitrogen oxides fee--set to average marginal abatement costs--is US $5,200 per ton.
In Southern California's RECLAIM program, a regional nitrogen oxides permit trading
system, the 1997 price of permits (for discharge in 1999) was $1,800 per ton (South Coast Air
Quality Management District, 1998).  Thus, Swedish fees and the Californian permit prices
exceed Polish fees by factors of 60 and 20, respectively.  Purchasing power parity differences
and the fact that marginal abatement costs in China and Poland are no doubt lower than in
Sweden probably account for some of the differences, but certainly not all of them.50
Regarding the structure of fees, the two-tiered design of China's and Poland's
emissions fees dampens incentives to abate.  In China, fees below the emissions standard are
zero and in Poland they are as little as one-tenth of the "penalty" fee rate.  As a result, firms
have little or no incentive to abate as long as they comply with the emissions standard.
Regarding the use of earmarked revenue, in both China and Poland, the mechanism for
disbursing the fee revenue offsets (to some degree) the incentives to abate created by the fees.
In both countries, the use of fee revenues to finance regulatory activity creates perverse
incentives on the part of regulators to ensure that polluters remain out of compliance and
continue to pay emissions fees.  Worse, in China, tax regulations that permit polluters to count
fee payments as production costs, coupled with minimal control over how polluters use
refunds, create parallel perverse invectives on the part of polluters to remain out of
compliance to continue to pay emissions fees.
But while design issues are partly responsible for the poor performance of emissions
fees in China and Poland, weak monitoring and enforcement are also to blame.  In both
countries, environmental protection organizations are undermanned and underfinanced, and
                                               
50 However, Chinese and Polish sulfur dioxide fees, also $280 per ton and $83 per ton respectively, are on par
with the price of allowances in the U.S. sulfur trading program, which have varied between $100 to $200.
However, US permit prices may reflect a glut in the permit market due to overinvestment in scrubbing capacity
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many firms--especially large state-owned enterprises with soft budget constraints--are
politically insulated from regulatory pressure.  The importance of constraints on monitoring is
starkly illustrated by the fact that in China, notwithstanding a system in which fees are
ostensibly assessed on emissions of 20 different air pollutants, regulators commonly rely on a
single out-dated and extremely crude measure of opacity to assess compliance and calculate
charges, and in Poland 40 percent of registered polluters operate without permits needed to
calculate fee rates.
A final factor that has contributed to the ineffectiveness of Chinese and Polish fees has
been the fact that in both countries many sources--mainly small firms and non-industrial
sources--fall outside of the fee system.
What lessons can be distilled from our case studies of emissions fees?  First, fees need
to be set high enough to have an impact on emissions and also need to be indexed to inflation.
Unfortunately, relatively high fees present a number of difficulties in a developing country
setting.  Politically, it may be difficult to raise fees to the requisite level:  firms are bound to
complain that they must pay fees on emissions in addition to paying to abate, and that the high
fees imperil their competitiveness.  Also, high fees could result in pervasive noncompliance
that might eventually threaten the legitimacy of the regulatory system.  These do not appear to
be insurmountable difficulties, however.  All three of the countries we have examined have
instituted measures that have reduced firms' compliance costs and made fees more politically
palatable, albeit at some cost in terms of environmental impact.  These include earmarking fee
revenue for the use of the firms that pay them, exempting small and economically fragile
firms from paying fees, using two-tiered fee structures to reduce regulatory costs for firms
that meet emissions standards, and differentiating fees across firms by vintage and
geographical location.
Second, earmarked fee revenue should be disbursed in a manner that preserves the
incentive properties of emissions fees.  The Swedish system appears to be a model in this
regard.  Fees are refunded to firms in proportion to output so that firms can always boost
profits by cutting emissions per unit of output.  In addition, unlike the Chinese regulators,
Swedish authorities place no restrictions on how firms use earmarked funds, thereby avoiding
the extremely problematic and costly responsibility of trying to monitor firms' expenditures in
addition to their emissions.  Finally, unlike Chinese and Polish authorities, Swedish regulators
do not depend on fee revenues to finance their operating expenses.51
The last point merits some qualification.  In countries where fiscal resources are in
extremely short supply, using fee revenue to finance regulatory activity may be a virtual
necessity, at least in the short run.  In such cases, it may be possible to design institutional
                                               
51 One aspect of the Swedish program that might present political difficulties is the economy-wide mechanism
for collecting and disbursing fee revenue that effectively transfers funds from economic sectors with high
emissions per unit of output to those with low emissions per unit of output.  Those sectors that are net providers
of funds would clearly be less apt to support such a system than those that are net recipients.  One potential
solution to this problem is create a number of smaller sector-wide mechanisms for the collection and disbursal of
funds.Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
26
mechanisms to dampen perverse incentives created by this arrangement, for example by
rewarding regulators who cut aggregate emissions and by creating environmental funds to
separate the collection and disbursement of fees as in Poland.  Still, if China is an accurate
guide, policy makers should recognize that there is likely to be some trade-offs between the
dependence on earmarked revenues to finance regulation and the effectiveness of that
regulation.
Third, to the extent possible, barriers to the effectiveness of emissions fees created by
pre-existing regulation should be removed or mitigated.  An example is tax laws that enable
Chinese and Polish firms to count most emissions fees as costs.
Finally, emissions fees clearly require some minimum level of credible monitoring and
enforcement.  Notwithstanding a perception that EI instruments are somehow market-based
and are therefore less dependent on an effective public-sector regulatory authority than CAC
instruments, our case studies clearly indicate that unless the institutional capability and
political will exists to provide a minimum level of monitoring and enforcement, emissions fees
will simply not have a significant environmental impact.  Of course this is a facile point: it
begs the question of how to improve monitoring and enforcement given constraints discussed
in Section 2.  Part of the answer has to do with building institutional capability and generating
political will, topics that are beyond the scope of this paper.  But another part has to do with the
choice of monitoring methods.  Of our three case studies, the only unambiguously successful
fee program is in Sweden where CEMs are used to monitor nitrogen oxides emissions.
Unfortunately, the cost of CEMs make them an unrealistic choice for most developing
countries, at least in the short run.  Recall that the annual costs of operating CEMs used in the
Swedish nitrogen oxides program (excluding capital costs) is $40,000 per firm while the
annual cost of the CEMs used in the US Sulfur Dioxide Program (including capital costs) is
$125,000 per firm.  Since second-best monitoring methods are the logical alternative,
emissions fee systems should probably be restricted to those pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide) for
which such methods are effective.  Unfortunately, second best methods are not well-suited to
monitoring particulate emissions, which according to conventional wisdom are the most
harmful to human health.
5.2   Tradable Permits
The Emission Trading Program, the United States' oldest tradable permit program for
air emissions, has had mixed success.  Although it has reduced compliance costs relative to a
pure CAC system, cost reductions have been smaller than expected.  Moreover, most analysts
agree that environmental impacts have been negligible.  The key problems include design
deficiencies (that mostly arise from an attempt to graft permit trading onto an underlying
complex CAC system), uncertainty, and imperfect information.  All of these factors raise
transactions costs and restrict trading.  By contrast, the newer Sulfur Dioxide Program has had
strong environmental and economic impacts, in large part because it was consciously
designed to overcome many of the problems that have plagued the ETP.  For example, the
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and places relatively few restrictions on either trading or abatement alternatives.  On the face
of it, the evolution from the ETP to the Sulfur Dioxide Program suggests that the success of
any air permit trading scheme depends largely on getting program design right, and that
armed with this lesson, developing country policy makers should be able to develop effective
air permit trading programs.  However, in our opinion, such a conclusion is unwarranted.
There are several aspects of the US experience that suggest that large-scale air permit
trading in developing countries would be problematic.  Most important, the success of the
Sulfur Dioxide Program depends critically on a high level of monitoring, enforcement, and
administration.  The sulfur dioxide permit market is viable and robust because participants
know that they will receive full credit for emissions reductions and that emissions limits
implied by allowances will be strictly enforced.  The effective monitoring and enforcement
that underpins the program is due to investments and institutions that would be difficult to
replicate in developing countries: monitoring depends on CEMs entailing annual expenditures
of over $100,000 per firm (recall that program planners deemed second-best monitoring to be
inadequate); enforcement of allowances, which is largely taken for granted, depends on
effective regulatory institutions; and program administration is carried out by firms and by
specially-created regulatory organizations costing millions of dollars per year.  In the near
term, such investments and institutions are probably beyond the reach of most developing
countries.  Importantly, a lack of monitoring, enforcement, and administrative capabilities is a
far more critical constraint on permit trading than on emissions fees.  Permit markets will
simply not work absent these capabilities, while emissions fees can, as the China and Poland
case studies illustrate.
Another cautionary lesson from the American experience is that, despite the fact that
markets are exceedingly well-developed in the United States, transactions costs, uncertainty,
imperfect information, and institutional rigidities have hampered the development of permit
markets.  In the case of the ETP, these factors (together with design problems), have been
blamed for the continued thinness of the emissions credit market, and in the case of the Sulfur
Dioxide Program, they have been blamed for the low trading volumes in the first several years
of the program.  Transactions costs, uncertainty, imperfect information, and institutional
rigidities are likely to be far more severe in developing countries.
5.3   Environmental Taxes
The only evidence we have on taxes specifically designed to have an environmental
impact are carbon and sulfur dioxide taxes in Sweden.  Both appear to have had a some
impact on emissions--although the impact of the former has been more significant and more
clear cut--and to have raised considerable revenue.
The Swedish experience holds several lessons for developing countries.  First, the
legislative history of Sweden's carbon taxes clearly illustrates that levying taxes set high
enough to have an environmental impact is likely to be quite difficult for political reasons.
Sweden was able to impose relatively high carbon taxes on industry in 1991 only because it
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succeeded in not only in completely eliminating carbon taxes but also in lowering
complementary energy taxes, thereby actually reducing real energy prices paid by industry
relative to 1991 prices.  In developing countries where the power of industrial lobbies often
swamps that of environmental advocates, political barriers to highly visible environmental
taxes are likely to be at least as important.  Second, not surprisingly, the Swedish experience
illustrates that taxes are relatively easy to administer.  Sweden has used existing tax
authorities to administer its environmental taxes.  Marginal administrative costs are estimated
to be in the range of  one to five percent of total revenues.  Third, tradeoffs between
environmental impacts and fiscal revenues are significant.  Revenue from Sweden's sulfur tax
has fallen as the tax has dampened demand for high-sulfur fuels.  Fourth, targeting
environmental taxes is feasible.  Sweden exempted industry from its carbon tax, and also
exempted those using coal, oil and peat as feedstock instead of as fuel from its sulfur tax.  It is
not clear that developing countries would be able to replicate Swedish efforts to create
incentives for end-of-pipe abatement by refunding tax payments to firms that install scrubbers
since Sweden used CEMs to prevent firms claiming refunds from cheating.  However, on the
face of it there is no obvious reason why second-best monitoring could not be used for the
same purpose.
5.4   Policy Prescriptions
We conclude this section with some final thoughts about the advisability of promoting
emissions fees, permit trading and environmental taxes in developing countries.  Regarding
emissions fees, our case studies clearly indicate that they are a politically feasible regulatory
alternative.  It is far less clear that they can be an effective means of stimulating emissions
reductions.  Part of the problem seems to be that many existing emissions fees systems in
developing countries have some critical design flaws (e.g., the level and structure of fees, and
the mechanism for refunding revenue) that in theory can be corrected.  But at least as
important as these design flaws is a lack of institutional capability and political will to provide
a minimum level of monitoring and enforcement, a problem that is not so easily corrected.
This suggests that the appropriateness of emission fee systems will vary across countries,
across regions within countries, and also across pollutants.  Yet there are several aspects of
the case studies presented above that argue in favor of promoting their establishment at a
national level.  First, once a fee system is in place, regulators may be able to raise fees and
strengthen enforcement over time (as has happened in Poland), a strategy that may minimize
resistance to establishing a high-fee system.  In other words, even low fees with negligible
impacts provide regulators with a "foot in the door."  By the time high fees are politically
feasible, marginal abatement costs may have risen making the costs savings that accrue to a
fee system more attractive.  Second, fee systems provide valuable revenue to finance
regulatory activity and direct investment in environmental projects.
Regarding permit trading, we have argued that the success of US policy makers at
developing trading programs, based in part on lessons learned about program design, is not
likely to be easily replicated in developing countries.  For most developing countries,Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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emissions fee programs would appear to be a more realistic and appropriate policy alternative.
The fact that (to our knowledge) there are no functioning air permit trading programs
anywhere in the developing world supports this view.52
Finally, regarding environmental taxes, the one case study we have examined suggests
that they do represent means of overcoming financial and institutional constraints on direct
regulation; can raise significant revenue; and can be targeted.  The principal barrier to their
use appears to be the political difficulty of levying taxes that are high enough to have an
environmental impact.
                                               
52 Regulators are attempting to set up permit trading systems in at least four cities:  Almaty, Kazakhstan;
Santiago, Chile; Chorzow, Poland; and Mexico City, Mexico.  So far these efforts have not been particularly
successful.  See Margolis, Trivedi, and Farrow (1995); Huber (1996); and Dudek, et al. (1992).Blackman and Harrington  RFF 99-39
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